Religious Authority and Political Instability in Israel

This is part of the MENA Politics Newsletter, Volume 3, Issue 1, Spring 2020. Download the PDF of this piece here.

Jewish religious political parties have historically played an important role in Israeli politics. Religious political parties receive on average about 20 percent of the vote. Israel’s Proportional Representation (PR) electoral system gives strength to the religious political parties and enabled them a large, often disproportionate, impact on national politics, frequently, determining whether the Israeli coalition tilts to the left or right. Three main political parties represent the diverse religious Jewish communities in Israel: the Jewish Home (Religious Zionism, or “modern Orthodox”), Shas (Sephardic Ultra-Orthodox), and United Torah Judaism (Ashkenazi Ultra-Orthodox).

However, recent sociological changes such as greater exposure to the internet have led to a decentralization of religious authority in Israel. The decentralization of religious authority in Israel interacts with two major factors, which cause the political fragmentation of the mainstream religious Zionist party and causes the radicalization of the Ultra-Orthodox parties. These factors are voter demand for religiously sanctioned parties and the institutional structure of the religious political party. Notably, the changing fortunes of Israel’s religious political parties have serious implications for Israeli democracy.

Religious parties in the Middle East, including Israel, rely heavily on clerics for legitimacy and popular support. Religious leaders tell their followers to vote en-masse for specific parties – and people do so with the expectation that they are fulfilling a religious commandment.[i] Thus, capable religious leadership translates into political power. However, recent developments in mass communications have weakened the authority of religious leaders, with the introduction of religious radio stations, more newspapers, and the internet. In turn, public exposure to the numerous sources of media, online information, and opinions fragment support for religious authorities.[ii]

Observers note a similar pattern in Israel where greater exposure to mass media and the internet, among other important sociological changes such as upward social mobility,[iii] has had an impact on the nature of religious authority (link). Religious leadership was centralized in the past, and religious parties, especially the ultra-orthodox ones, relied on religious authorities to espouse their politics. For instance, Shas was able to rely on Rabbi Ovadiah Yosef and the Ultra-Orthodox Ashkenazi parties relied on one, agreed-upon “great rabbi of the generation” (Gadol Hador), such as Rabbi Shach. But, with increased information comes increased choice; today there is no clear religious leader in either of the ultra-orthodox camps. There are many leading rabbis – but no one, centralized figure. Religious communities are more fragmented, have greater competition between religious leaders, and are less united in their choice of a leader.

This decentralization of religious authority has impacted the religious political parties in different ways. Israel’s main religious Zionist political party split into the Jewish Home and the New Right in the run-up to the April 2019 elections. Further splits followed with six political parties competing for votes from the religious Zionist community. After the April 2019 elections, several smaller parties did not run again, and pragmatic alliances were formed between the different political parties (Yamina). This alliance was unstable, and the party split after the September 2019 elections. Only after several months of contentious negotiations did the parties agree to run together for the March 2020 elections (link). They won only 6 seats, with many potential voters moving to other parties such as Netanyahu’s Likud party.

Historically, the Ultra-Orthodox parties were comfortable serving in right-wing and left-wing coalitions (including Shas support for Oslo, without which the Oslo Peace Accords would never have been signed). However, during the 2019 elections, Shas identified strongly with the right-wing parties. In addition, the leadership has made more policy demands in the religion and state realm. These demands alienate potential right-wing partners (such as Avigdor Lieberman’s Yirael Beitenu party popular with extreme right wing but secular voters) and are seen as disconnected from the average supporter of the party (link).

Two main factors explain how decentralization of power within religious leadership shapes the contemporary political fortunes and positions of Israel’s Jewish religious political parties.

Religious voters’ demand for religiously sanctioned parties: Voters for whom a religiously sanctioned party is critical are less likely to move to a secular party, while voters for whom religious sanction is less important are relatively more likely to do so.

The institutional structure of the political party: Some religious political parties include formal institutions run by religious leaders who make decisions for the party (including, for example, the composition of the list or how the party should vote on important decisions), while other parties may affiliate with a religious stream (such as religious Zionism) and defer to religious advisors, but the decision of the latter are informal and non-binding.

The table below maps Israeli political parties based on these factors.

Weakening of the Religious Zionist Parties

Religious Zionist voters historically placed less importance on religious authority than do typical religious parties in the Middle East. Political leadership would occasionally consult with specific religious leaders, but did not treat their decisions as binding. However, disagreements over several religious issues, including the religious nature of the state, religious gender equality (especially support for female prayer at the Western Wall), support for illegal settlements, and female political leadership, have polarized the community.

These divisions became especially prominent during the 2005 disengagement from Gaza, which was seen by many members of the religious Zionist community as a betrayal by the state to settle the land of Israel.[iv] While most community leaders ruled that it was illegal for religious soldiers to disobey orders to evacuate settlements, other leaders called for mass refusal and promised that the expulsion would never happen since it went against the divine will (link).

Reflecting the divisions within the community, religious Zionist political parties then split between a more liberal group that believes their political influence is hampered by the involvement of religious leaders in politics and a more conservative group that believes that political parties need to submit to the authority of religious leaders. The Ultra-Orthodox parties have even campaigned for these religious Zionist voters, with messages such as “Judaism without compromises” (link). In turn, different religious leaders from these two sub-communities endorse different parties. This spread of religious Zionist voters over several parties, including larger parties such as the Likud, lowers the overall electoral strength of the community.

Radicalization of the Ultra-Orthodox Parties

Despite high religious fragmentation, formal religious bodies allow Ultra-Orthodox parties to largely maintain their electoral power, despite divisions within religious streams (e.g.: Lithuanian versus Chasidic). This is due to the fact that the Ultra-Orthodox parties set up a Rabbinic body which is composed of key leaders from the different streams who settles divisive issues such as the order of the candidate list. Furthermore, the party does not allow for primaries or women to run for political leadership.

In contrast, in local city elections where there is no formal religious body to bridge the gaps, religious disagreements have political consequences. For example, in the most recent municipal elections in Jerusalem, the Ultra-Orthodox parties ran competing lists and publicly backed different candidates for mayor (link). For example, secular Mayor Nir Barkat lost the Jerusalem elections in 2003 and was only successful in 2008 because one ultra-Orthodox Hasidic sect refrained from voting for Barkat’s religious competitor.

Yet, this consensus comes at a cost. Rabbinic consensus generally adopts the most extreme position in order to avoid a split, which gives extremists great power. [v] For example, several uncompromising and unpopular demands in the religion and state realm, such as the directive to not perform infrastructure work on the Sabbath and to close all grocery stores on the Sabbath, originated from the head of the Gur community. This legislation was ultimately pushed by the ultra-orthodox parties, despite strong internal opposition, in order to prevent a formal split within the political party.

In summary, political parties with formal religious institutions are more likely to survive. These parties are also more likely to be run by Jewish law and are less likely to hold by several democratic norms. The combination of political flux and intransigent demands among Israel’s religious political parties leads to less electoral stability and was an important contributing factor to repeat elections in Israel (link). Due to the religious community’s large birth rates, these political parties are likely to gain more political power in the future, becomingly increasingly reliant on more extreme political views in order to maintain the peace among religious leaders.

[i] Sharan Grewal et al., “Poverty and Divine Rewards: The Electoral Advantage of Islamist Political Parties,” American Journal of Political Science63, no. 4 (July 8, 2019): 859–74, doi:10.1111/ajps.12447.

[ii] Richard A Nielsen, “The Changing Face of Islamic Authority in the Middle East,” Middle East Brief 99 (2016): 1–8.

[iii] Other sociological changes have also contributed to the weakening of religious authority. These include greater socio-economic mobility and more exposure to Israeli society via university and college studies. See Haim Zicherman and Lee Cahaner, “Modern Ultra-Orthodoxy: The Emergence of a Haredi Middle Class in Israel,” The Israel Democracy Institute (Hebrew), 2012.

[iv] Nadav G. Shelef and Orie Shelef, “Democratic Inclusion and Religious Nationalists in Israel,” Political Science Quarterly 128, no. 2 (2013): 289–316, doi:10.1002/polq.12038; Michael Freedman, “Fighting from the Pulpit: Religious Leaders and Violent Conflict in Israel,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 63, no. 10 (2019): 2262–88.

[v] Charles S Liebman, “Extremism as a Religious Norm,” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 1983, 75–86; Lisa Blaydes and Drew A. Linzer, “Elite Competition, Religiosity, and Anti-Americanism in the Islamic World,” American Political Science Review 106, no. 02 (2012): 225–43, doi:10.1017/S0003055412000135; Barbara F Walter, “The Extremist’s Advantage in Civil Wars,” International Security 42, no. 2 (2017): 7–39, doi:10.1162/ISEC.