religious authority, on the one hand, and voter demand for religiously sanctioned parties and the institutional structure of the religious political parties, on the other, shapes relative radicalization and the power of religious parties resonates well beyond the case of Israel.

Nadav Shelef, University of Wisconsin – Madison, shelef@wisc.edu

IT'S US OR THEM: PARTISAN POLARIZATION IN ISRAEL AND BEYOND

By Lotem Bassan-Nygate and Chagai M. Weiss

Jewish Israelis are divided into two hostile political camps: center-left- and right-wing supporters. This division, which political scientists often refer to as partisan polarization, is clearly reflected in recent campaign advertisements which emphasize an "us" vs. "them" mentality (see Figure 1). The severity of partisan polarization is also reflected in public opinion, with a plurality of Jewish Israeli respondents in a recent survey identifying the tensions between the left and the right as the most acute cleavage in Israeli society, even more than that between Jews and Arabs.[85] Recent media reports further emphasize this pattern, which is strikingly apparent from the words of a right-winger, interviewed during a recent support rally for Prime-Minister Benjamin Netanyahu:

"All of you together, all the left-wing supporters... You don't have a heart, you don't have emotions, you have nothing... You are just ungrateful traitors."[86]

Such animosity, often conceptualized as affective polarization, can be measured by the gap between in-party affect and out-party dislike.[87] Figure 2 uses this measure, based on party feeling thermometers from the Israeli National Elections Studies, to provide a systematic overview of

affective polarization in Israel over the last eleven election cycles (1988-2019). It reveals several interesting patterns.

Figure 1: 2015 Zionist Union (top) and Likud (bottom) Campaign Advertisements – Both advertisements employ the same slogan "It's us or them/him."

First, affective polarization reached an all-time high during the mid-nineties, following the Oslo accords and the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin by a right-wing extremist. Second, since Netanyahu took office (for the second time) in 2009, affective polarization seems to be on a steady rise. The temporal variation depicted in Figure 2 raises a myriad of questions regarding the causes, effects, and remedies of affective polarization in Israel.

To address these questions, and to encourage scholars of Israeli politics to engage in the study of polarization, we follow three steps. First, we provide a brief account of existing theory and evidence regarding polarization. Second, we describe the nascent literature on affective polarization in Israel, including our recent study which leverages natural and survey experiments to identify institutional causes and remedies of polarization.[88] Lastly, we conclude with an overview of fruitful paths for future research on affective polarization in Israel, and the Middle East more broadly.

*Red denotes Likud governments, blue denotes Labor governments, and green denotes center/unity governments.

Figure 2: Affective Polarization in Israel over time - Each point estimate represents an average polarization scores amongst voters from a given study of the INES. We measure affective polarization at the respondent level by identifying respondents as either right- or left-wing supporters (employing a common 7-point ideology scale), and subtracting their affect towards the leading out-party from their affect towards the leading in-party. We focus on the two right (left) leading parties during this time period: Likud and Labor.

What Do We Know About Affective Polarization?

Polarization seems to be endemic to modern democracy. Existing theory and evidence from American and comparative politics suggest that political campaigns,[89] elite ideological polarization,[90] economic inequality,[91] selective repression,[92] media consumption,[93] and majoritarian electoral institutions,[94] all contribute to affective polarization. While affective polarization may have some limited virtues, such as enhanced political participation,[95] scholars have focused for the most part on its adverse social consequences. These negative consequences include challenges to governance,[96] economic discrimination,[97] social sorting, and homophily.[98]

The negative consequences of polarization have motivated scholars to search for potential remedies which may depolarize partisans.[99] Thus,

empirical evidence suggests that correcting misperceptions and stereotypes regarding party supporters,[100] and increasing the salience of a shared national identity as an alternative to a divisive partisan identity,[101] can decrease affective polarization. That being said, efforts to emphasize partisan ambivalence or to employ psychological self-affirmation techniques seem to be ineffective in reducing polarization.[102] Taken together, the existing literature, which has for the most part examined the American electorate,[103] points to institutional as well as psychological causes, effects, and remedies of polarization.

What Do We Know About Polarization in Israel?

The right-left divide has become a dominant cleavage within Jewish Israeli society since the 1970s.[104] This cleavage is closely associated with polarizing debates about whether or not Israel should withdraw from occupied territories.[105] In recent years there has been a growing scholarly interest in exploring polarization amongst the Israeli public. Garrett et al. demonstrate that exposure to co-partisan media outlets is associated with increased affective polarization, and Tsfati and Nir investigate the mechanisms linking selective media exposure with increased polarization.[106] More generally, Shamir et al. present a longitudinal investigation of polarization trends since the late 1980s, and call for future research to consider the causes and effects of polarization in Israel.[107]

We follow Shamir et al.'s call for action in our recent working paper, and employ natural and survey experiments to study the effects of electoral competition and cooperation on affective polarization in Israel.[108] Leveraging the random assignment of survey respondents to interview dates over seven national election studies, we demonstrate that enhanced electoral competition, measured by interview date proximity to an election, increases the gap between in-party affect and out-party dislike. This is an alarming finding, as electoral competition is a central component of democratic practice, yet it seems to have negative externalities for partisan intergroup relations. Therefore, we further ask: what political arrangements might offset the externalities

imposed by elections, and alleviate polarization?

To answer this question, we implemented a unique experiment in which we leveraged the ambiguity around coalition formation in Israel's 22nd Knesset (2019), to shape survey respondents' perceptions regarding the likelihood that a unity government will form in the near future. At the time, it was unclear whether the two leading parties (Likud and Blue White) would form a broad unity government, a narrow coalition led by one or the other, or lead Israel to a third election. Leveraging this uncertainty, we informed subjects in the treatment group that political experts expect that a unity government will form in the near future. Subjects in the control group were told that a narrow government is expected to form.[109]

The results of this experiment demonstrate that information regarding cross-party cooperation in the form of a unity government can depolarize the electorate; specifically, respondents who are informed that a unity government will form in the near future, report warmer attitudes towards supporters of competing parties. In interpreting our evidence, we emphasize that elites, and the political arrangements they make, play a central role in shaping polarization. Indeed, we demonstrate that electoral competition and cooperation at the elite level has direct effects on mass partisan polarization. More so, we demonstrate how methodological approaches previously used by scholars of intergroup relations, can be adapted to identify the effects of endogenous institutional variables on polarization.[110]

Moving Forward: An Agenda for the Study of Polarization in Israeli Politics and Beyond

Our study takes a first step in evaluating the institutional causes and remedies of polarization in Israel.[111] While our evidence sheds light on several consequential questions, it suggests a number of paths for future empirical research.

1. Does the emergence of centrist parties depolarize voters?
2. How does exposure to violence and conflict affect partisan polarization?

3. Can institutional and electoral reforms (i.e. changing electoral thresholds, or alternating between proportional representation and split ticket voting) influence polarization?
4. Do mass-protests attenuate partisan polarization?

In some regards, Israel is unique to the Middle East, as its relatively stable and competitive electoral institutions facilitated the emergence of strong partisan identities. However, exciting research from Tunisia and Egypt exploring the emergence of political polarization between opposition movements and parties suggests that both affective and ideological polarization are relevant in multiple countries throughout the region, especially those experiencing democratic transitions.[112] Our research suggests that democratic transitions that introduce electoral competition may serve to polarize existing (or newly formed) identities, and that the adaptation of "kinder and gentler" forms of governance, may mitigate such externalities.[113]

Finally, returning to the Israeli case, it is evident that polarizing discourse has become central to the political arena in recent years. While in our research we focus on citizen's attitudes towards one another, one may wonder if polarized attitudes translate into polarized policy. Anecdotal evidence from Israel suggests that it does. Indeed, right-wing ministers and members of Knesset have targeted cultural centers associated with the Israeli left such as the Barbur gallery in Jerusalem, as well as human right groups such as Breaking the Silence, using both administrative and legislative means.[114] Whether these policies are a cause of mass polarization or its effect is yet another fascinating question begging rigorous empirical research.

Lotem Bassan-Nygate, University of Wisconsin – Madison, lbassan@wisc.edu, and Chagai M. Weiss, University of Wisconsin – Madison, cmweiss3@wisc.edu

Research of Turkey (Research Turkey) 3, no. 12 (2014): 76–92.

65 Bonnie Meguid, "Competition Between Unequals: The Role of Mainstream Party Strategy in Niche Party Success," *American Political Science Review* 99, no 3.

Zabun Notes

66 "At least 34 Turkish soldiers killed in air strikes in Syria's Idlib: Syrian Observatory," *Reuters*, 27 February 2020: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-security-toll/at-least-34-turkish-soldiers-killed-in-air-strikes-in-syrias-idlib-syrian-observatory-idUSKCN20L32S

67 "Turkey Declares Major Offensive Against Syrian Government," *New York Times,* 1 March 2020*:* https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/01/world/middleeast/turkey-syria-assault.html

68 Aykan Erdemir and Merve Tahiroglu, "The Pastor Is Not the Only US Hostage in Turkey," *War on the Rocks*, 23 August 2018: https://warontherocks.com/2018/08/the-pastor-is-not-the-only-u-s-hostage-in-turkey/

69 "What Turkey's purchase of a Russian air defense system means for the U.S. and NATO," *Washington Post,* 23 July 2019:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/07/23/what-turkeys-s-purchase-means-us-nato/

70 "Downing of Russian jet a 'pilot's mistake,' says Turkish President Erdoğan," *Hurriyet Daily News*, 31 May 2016: https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/downing-of-russian-jet-a-pilots-mistake-says-turkish-president-erdogan--99925

71 "Erdoğan: Bir pilotun hatasıyla Türkiye'nin gözden çıkarılması…," *Aljazeera,* 31 May 2016: http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/erdogan-bir-pilotun-hatasiyla-turkiyenin-gozden-cikarilmasi

72 William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000* (Taylor & Francis, 2002), 65-66.

73 In the game theoretical sense, uncertainty increases the odds of war. According to Fearon, high levels of uncertainty based on private information can be seen as a rationalist explanation of war.
James D. Fearon, "Rationalist explanations for war," *International Organization* 49, no.3 (1995): 379-414.

74 See different applications of this perspective:
Itay Fischhendler, "When ambiguity in treaty design becomes destructive: a study of transboundary water," *Global Environmental Politics* 8, no. 1 (2008): 111-136.
Drazen Pehar, "Use of Ambiguities in Peace Agreements," in *Language and Diplomacy,* ed. Jovan Kurbalija and Hannah Slavik (Malta: Diplo Foundation, 2001), 163-200.
Juyan Zhang and Yi Han, "Testing the rhetoric of China's soft power campaign: a case analysis of its strategic ambiguity in the Six Party Talks over North Korea's nuclear program," *Asian Journal of Communication* 23, No.2, (2013): 191-208.

Antoine Rayroux, "Speaking EU defence at home: Contentious discourses and constructive ambiguity," *Cooperation and Conflict* 49, No.3 (2014): 386-405.

75 Ferhat Zabun, "Cooperation through Strategic Ambiguity: A Discursive-Institutionalist Analysis of the Annan Plan," *Uluslararasi Iliskiler* (under review)

76 See different applications of this perspective:
Sandeep Baliga and Tomas Sjöström, "Strategic Ambiguity and Arms Proliferation," *Journal of Political Economy* 116, no. 6 (2008): 1023-1057.
Patrick Hummel, "Strategic Ambiguity and Military Capacity with Multiple Adversaries," *Journal of Theoretica Politics* 27, no. 2 (2015): 288-300.
Why Trump's Shapeshifting Syria Policy Worked—Until It Didn't," *Foreign Affairs,* 13 November 2019: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2019-11-13/why-trumps-shapeshifting-syria-policy-worked-until-it-didnt

77 Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical realism and theories of foreign policy," *World politics* 51, no.1 (1998): 154.

78 Stephen Walt, "Alliances in a Unipolar World," *World Politics* 61, No. 1 (2009): 94

79 "U.S. Is 'Working On' Extraditing Gulen, Top Turkish Official Says," *New York Times*, 16 December 2018: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/16/world/europe/fethullah-gulen-turkey-extradite.html

80 "Erdogan blames 'foreign powers' for coup and says West is supporting terrorism," *Independent,* 2 August 2016: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/erdogan-turkey-coup-latest-news-blames-us-west-terrorism-gulen-a7168271.html

81 "US-Turkey alliance in downward spiral as Congress mulls sanctions," *Defense News*, 30 October 2019: https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2019/10/30/us-turkey-alliance-in-downward-spiral-as-congress-mulls-sanctions

82 Gonul Tol and Omer Taspinar, "Turkey's Russian Roulette," *The MENA region: A Great Power Competition* (2019): 118-120.

83 Stephen Walt, "Alliances in a Unipolar World," *World Politics* 61, No. 1 (2009): 94-96.

84 Jack Detsch, "Turkey Asks US for Missile Defense Amid Syria Standoff," *Al Monitor*, 21 February 2020: https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/02/turkey-asks-us-patriot-syria-standoff.html

Bassan-Nygate and Weiss Notes

85 Yohanan Plesner, Tamar Hermann, Ella Heller, Or Anabi, and Fadi Omar, "Israeli Democracy Index 2018," *Israel Democracy Institute*, December 2018, https://en.idi.org.il/articles/25024.

86 Oren Aharoni. "Lefties are jealous: Documentation of Netanyahu's support rally," *Kan News*, November 2019,

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LKxUF2wGjSc. See also, *Walla News*, "Lefties Deserve to Die, Amen," June 2016, https://tech.walla.co.il/item/2968958; Or Ravid, "42 percent of Israelis Believe that the Deepest Cleavage in Society is between Right and Left," *Walla News*, April 2017, https://news.walla.co.il/item/3054028.

[87] Shanto Iyengar, Yphtach Lelkes, Matthew Levendusky, Neil Malhotra, and Sean J. Westwood. "The origins and consequences of affective polarization in the United States." *Annual Review of Political Science* 22 (2019): 129-146; James N. Druckman and Matthew S. Levendusky, "What Do We Measure When We Measure Affective Polarization?," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 83, no. 1 (2019): 114–122; Noam Gidron, James Adams, and Will Horne, "Toward a Comparative Research Agenda on Affective Polarization in Mass Publics," *APSA Comparative Politics Newsletter* 29 (2019): 30–36.

[88] Lotem Bassan-Nygate and Chagai M. Weiss, "Party Competition and Cooperation Shape Affective Polarization: Evidence from Natural and Survey Experiments in Israel", *APSA Preprints* (2020) https://preprints.apsanet.org/engage/apsa/article-details/5e3c2a3659fb750019f8583a.

[89] Shanto Iyengar, Gaurav Sood, and Yphtach Lelkes, "Affect, not ideology a social identity perspective on polarization," *Public opinion quarterly* 76, no. 3 (2012):405–431; Gaurav Sood and Shanto Iyengar, "Coming to dislike your opponents: the polarizing impact of political campaigns," *Available at SSRN 2840225*, 2016.

[90] Jon C. Rogowski and Joseph L. Sutherland, "How ideology fuels affective polarization," *Political Behavior* 38, no. 2 (2016): 485–508; Ioannis Andreadis and Yannis Stavrakakis, "Dynamics of Polarization in the Greek Case," *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 681, no. 1 (2019): 157–172.

[91] Noam Gidron, James Adams, and Will Horne, "How Ideology, Economics and Institutions Shape Affective Polarization in Democratic Polities," in *Annual Conference of the American Political Science Association* (2018).

[92] Elizabeth Nugent, "The Psychology of Repression and Polarization," *World Politics*, Forthcoming, 2019.

[93] Matthew S. Levendusky, "Why do partisan media polarize viewers?," *American Journal of Political Science* 57, no. 3 (2013): 611–623; Yphtach Lelkes, Gaurav Sood, and Shanto Iyengar, "The hostile audience: The effect of access to broadband internet on partisan affect," *American Journal of Political Science* 61, no. 1 (2017): 5–20.

[94] Gidron, Adams, and Horne, "How Ideology, Economics and Institutions Shape Affective Polarization in Democratic Polities."

[95] Shanto Iyengar and Masha Krupenkin, "The strengthening of partisan affect," *Political Psychology* 39 (2018): 201–218.

[96] Marc J. Hetherington and Thomas J. Rudolph, *Why Washington won't work: Polarization, political trust, and the governing crisis* (University of Chicago Press, 2015).

[97] Christopher McConnell et al., "The economic consequences of partisanship in a polarized era," *American Journal of Political Science* 62, no. 1 (2018): 5–18.

[98] Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes, "Affect, not ideology a social identity perspective on polarization"; Gregory A. Huber and Neil Malhotra, "Political homophily in social relationships: Evidence from online dating behavior," *The Journal of Politics* 79, no.1 (2017): 269–283.

[99] Iyengar et al., "The origins and consequences of affective polarization in the United States."

[100] Douglas J. Ahler and Gaurav Sood, "The parties in our heads: Misperceptions about party composition and their consequences," *The Journal of Politics* 80, no. 3(2018): 964–981.

[101] Matthew S. Levendusky, "Americans, not partisans: Can priming American national identity reduce affective polarization?," *The Journal of Politics* 80, no. 1 (2018):59–70; Ryan E. Carlin and Gregory J. Love, "Political competition, partisanship and interpersonal trust in electoral democracies," *British Journal of Political Science* 48,no. 1 (2018): 115–139.

[102] Matthew S. Levendusky, "When efforts to depolarize the electorate fail," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 82, no. 3 (2018): 583–592.

[103] Gidron, Adams, and Horne, "How Ideology, Economics and Institutions Shape Affective Polarization in Democratic Polities."

[104] Michal Shamir, Sarah Dvir-Gvirtzman, and Raphael Vantura, "Shvuim Be-ShesaHa-Zehut Ha-Collectivit," in *The Elections in Israel – 2015,* ed. Michal Shamir and Gideon Rahat (The Israeli Democracy Institute, 2017), 146-176.

[105] Asher Arian and Michal Shamir, "Candidates, parties and blocs: Israel in the 1990s," *Party Politics* 7, no. 6 (2001): 689–710.

[106] Garrett, R. Kelly, Shira Dvir Gvirsman, Benjamin K. Johnson, Yariv Tsfati, Rachel Neo, and Aysenur Dal. "Implications of pro-and counter attitudinal information exposure for affective polarization." *Human Communication Research* 40, no. 3 (2014): 309-332; Yariv Tsfati and Lilach Nir, "Frames and reasoning: Two pathways from selective exposure to affective polarization," *International Journal of Communication* 11 (2017):22.

[107] Shamir, Dvir-Gvirtzman, and Vantura, "Shvuim Be-Shesa Ha-Zehut Ha-Collectivit."

[108] Bassan-Nygate and Weiss, "Party Competition and Cooperation Shape Affective Polarization: Evidence from Natural and Survey Experiments in Israel."

[109] We further randomized leader identity (Benjamin Netanyahu and Benny Gantz), to rule out the possibility that respondents in the unity government condition assume that Netanyahu will serve as the next prime-minister.

[110] Benn Eifert, Edward Miguel, and Daniel N. Posner, "Political competition and ethnic identification in Africa," *American Journal of Political Science* 54, no. 2 (2010):494–510; Margaret E. Tankard and Elizabeth Levy Paluck, "The effect of a Supreme Court decision regarding gay marriage on

social norms and personal attitudes," *Psychological science* 28, no. 9 (2017): 1334–1344.

[111] Bassan-Nygate and Weiss, "Party Competition and Cooperation Shape Affective Polarization: Evidence from Natural and Survey Experiments in Israel."

[112] Nugent, "The Psychology of Repression and Polarization."

[113] Arend Lijphart, *Patterns of democracy: Government forms and performance in thirty-six countries* (Yale University Press, 2012).

[114] Mia Ashri, "Culture Minister Regev Against the Barbur Gallery: Immediate legislation is required to deny its budget," *Haaretz*, June 2018, https://www.haaretz.co.il/gallery/art/.premium-1.6153763. Jonathan Lis, "Israel Passes Law Meant to Keep Breaking the Silence Out of Schools," *Haaretz*, July 2018, https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-israel-passes-law-targeting-groups-that-support-soldiers-indictment-1.6284735.

Michael Freedman Notes

[115] Sharan Grewal et al., "Poverty and Divine Rewards: The Electoral Advantage of Islamist Political Parties," *American Journal of Political Science* 63, no. 4 (July 8, 2019): 859–74, doi:10.1111/ajps.12447.

[116] Richard A Nielsen, "The Changing Face of Islamic Authority in the Middle East," *Middle East Brief* 99 (2016): 1–8.

[117] Other sociological changes have also contributed to the weakening of religious authority. These include greater socio-economic mobility and more exposure to Israeli society via university and college studies. See Haim Zicherman and Lee Cahaner, "Modern Ultra-Orthodoxy: The Emergence of a Haredi Middle Class in Israel," *The Israel Democracy Institute (Hebrew)*, 2012.

[118] Nadav G. Shelef and Orie Shelef, "Democratic Inclusion and Religious Nationalists in Israel," *Political Science Quarterly* 128, no. 2 (2013): 289–316, doi:10.1002/polq.12038; Michael Freedman, "Fighting from the Pulpit: Religious Leaders and Violent Conflict in Israel," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63, no. 10 (2019): 2262–88.

[119] Charles S Liebman, "Extremism as a Religious Norm," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 1983, 75–86; Lisa Blaydes and Drew A. Linzer, "Elite Competition, Religiosity, and Anti-Americanism in the Islamic World," *American Political Science Review* 106, no. 02 (2012): 225–43, doi:10.1017/S0003055412000135; Barbara F Walter, "The Extremist's Advantage in Civil Wars," *International Security* 42, no. 2 (2017): 7–39, doi:10.1162/ISEC.

Meirav Jones and Lihi Ben Shitrit Notes

[120] https://www.haaretz.co.il/news/elections/1.7829170

[121] The Israeli Right did not accept the plan as a whole, it rejected the part of the plan that outlined a vision for a limited – and not sovereign – Palestinian State.

[122] https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Peace-to-Prosperity-0120.pdf, pp. 8-9.

[123] Hans Kelsen, "The Principle of Sovereign Equality of States as a Basis for International Organization," Yale Law Journal 53 (1944); Benedict Kingsbury, "Sovereignty and Inequality," *The European Journal of International Law* 9 (1998), 599-625; Jean L. Cohen, "Sovereign Equality vs. Imperial Right: The Battle Over the "New World Order", Constellations 13:4 (2006), 485-505;

[124] First published in 1997 by the Center for Educational Technology, now available online to subscribers that include Israel's colleges and universities, publishing houses, and news outlets: https://www.ravmilim.co.il/naerr.asp

[125] Wikipedia has been studied as a source utilized by both school and college students, alongside other sources of knowledge. Alison Head and Michael Eisenberg, "How Today's College Students Use Wikipedia for Course-Related Research," *First Monday* 15:3 (2010); Sook Lim, How and Why do College Students Use Wikipedia?" *Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology* 60:11 (2009) 2189-2202. Scholarship on Israel has argued that Wikipedia is a more valuable source of information resource than teachers appreciate. Hagit Meishar-Tal, "Teachers' Use of Wikipedia with their Students," Australian Journal of Teacher Education 40:12 (2005). Further, in Computer Science, Wikipedia is nowadays being used as a resource to recreate natural-language processing, leaning on the vast amount of human knowledge encoded within it. Evgeniy Gabrilovich, Shaul Markovitch, "Wikipedia-based Semantic Interpretation for Natural Language Processing," *Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research* 34 (2009), 443-498. Finally, recent studies have found that Wikipedia is legitimated by US news sources, partly by their reliance upon it. Marcus Messner and Jeff South, "Legitimizing Wikipedia," Journalism Practice (2011) 5:2. Wikipedia is thus an important resource for both human and computer learning, as well as for information gathering and wide dissemination, and its content is more significant than might otherwise be assumed.

[126] Wikipedia, "Ribonut" [Hebrew], Accessed April 3, 2020.

[127] Wikipedia, "Sovereignty," Accessed April 3, 2020

[128] Adnut was a stated goal of the "Lehi" movement, as articulated in its charter. Lehi was an acronym for *Lohamei Heirut Israel*, or Israel Freedom Fighters. The Lehi's 18-point charter called "Principles of Rebirth", identifies its goal as *adnut* over the entire biblical land of Israel (point 11 on the charter), and redemption (point 4a) ultimately to be marked by the construction of the third temple in Jerusalem (point 18). Conquering the land from non-Jewish inhabitants (using the term kibush, which is currently used for "occupation") is point 10 on the charter. https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/f8/18_Principles_of_Rebirth.jpg. The Sovereignty Movement sees itself as conducting a campaign to evade the possibility of dividing the land of Israel and to push for Jewish control over