mentioned the party name, while those who interacted with other parties sometimes named a candidate instead of a party, indicative of the Ennahda's stronger party institutionalization.

Clientelistic linkages also strengthened electoral support for Ennahda more effectively than similar interactions between citizens and members of other parties. In 2011, Ennahda voters were more likely to be male, religious, poorer, less educated, less affluent, and urban than those who voted for other parties or no party at all. By 2012, Ennahda's voter base was made up to a larger extent by citizens who supported a strong role of religion in politics. Decided Ennahda voters were also disproportionately those citizens whom the party had reached through constituency service by Ennahda parliamentarians. Importantly, relatively few of those who were served by an Ennahda member had voted for the party in 2011. But those who reported a constituency service interaction with Ennahda were more likely to continue to support the party in 2014 than those who had no such interaction. This indicates that both religious ideology as well as particularistic benefits in the form of constituency service contributed to the development of Ennahda's voter based by 2014.

Conclusions: The importance of comparisons between Islamist and non-Islamist parties

This research challenges the conventional wisdom that religious ideology alone explains Ennahda's electoral success. It also allows for a direct test of the role that Ennahda's organizational capacity and constituency service plays in explaining its electoral success. More often than other parties, Ennahda reached out to citizens who are relatively more marginalized from power, including co-religionists and women (Abdel-Samad and Benstead 2016; Arat 2005; Ayata 1996; Benstead 2016; Clark and Schwedler 2003; Philbrick Yadav 2014; White 2002). And this strategy—along with its better developed organizational capacity and party cohesiveness—enabled Ennahda to translate its constituency service into electoral gains more effectively than other parties, even it if ultimately did not prevail against the new party, Nida Tounes, in 2014.

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Scholars can gain new insights by focusing on a particular political process as the unit of analysis and comparing the frequency and success of such interactions across political actors.

This paper—and the larger project of which it is a part—illustrates an important methodological insight about the value of survey research in general and the use of classic questionnaires from studies of legislative behavior in the United States to study electoral politics in transitional regimes. Many scholars who study Islamist parties or politicians from particular groups—such as female or Islamist female parliamentarians—focus their research on these groups themselves while paying less attention to members of other political parties or social groups (e.g., non-Islamist parties or male parliamentarians). Yet scholars can gain new insights by focusing on a particular political process as the unit of analysis—in this case the constituency service interaction—and comparing the frequency and success of such interactions *across* political actors (i.e., comparing Islamist and non-Islamist parties, male and female citizens). By doing so, it is possible to capture the universe of citizen-parliamentarian interactions for all political parties and to utilize it as a reliable measure of the extent to which ideology and constituency service explains electoral success. This new stream of evidence, when triangulated with other quantitative and quantitative data collection, can be invaluable for answering important theoretical questions in Middle East political science and integrating it into comparative politics cross-regionally.

THE RESILIENCE OF ALGERIA'S PROTEST MOVEMENT

By Sharan Grewal, College of William & Mary

Seven months after overthrowing President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Algerians are still in the streets. Mass protests have continued every Friday since Bouteflika's ouster in April, urging authorities to not just reshuffle the leadership but

initiate a complete change of the political system.

Most scholars and observers agree that continued protests after the ouster of a dictator can put pressure on elites to follow through on commitments to democratize.[25] However, seven months in, the Algerian regime has yet to budge, seemingly hoping for the protests to fizzle out and for non-protesters to grow tired of the protests. Indeed, recent scholarship suggests that continued protests can be a double-edged sword, potentially driving non-protesters to grow frustrated not only with protests but with democracy more generally.[26]

This discussion raises the question: to what extent have we seen protest fatigue in Algeria, both among protesters and non-protesters? Are each of these groups just as committed to the cause as they were back in April when Bouteflika fell?

Surveying Algeria's uprising

An online survey of Algerians that has been ongoing since April can help to answer these questions.[27] Since April 1, my colleagues M.Tahir Kilavuz, Robert Kubinec, and I have been fielding

a survey in Algeria through advertisements on Facebook.[28] The advertisements have been shown to all Algerian Facebook users over 18 years old and living in Algeria. Clicking on the advertisement takes users to Qualtrics, where they complete a consent form and then fill out the survey.[29] (You can read more about the methodology, and how we screen for bots or other irregularities, here).

The Facebook sample is of course not nationally representative. Only about 45 percent of Algerians (about 19 million) are on Facebook.[30] As Table 1 indicates, compared to the general population, the Facebook sample skews more urban and better educated, among other biases.[31] However, on key political attitudes, such as support for democracy, frustration with the economy, and trust in the police, the Facebook survey obtains relatively similar results to the most recent wave of the Arab Barometer. Despite that, there are likely unmeasured psychological differences between the general population and the subset active on Facebook and willing to take surveys advertised there.

Table 1: Representativeness of Facebook Survey in Algeria

	Census (%)	Arab Barometer (%)	Facebook Ads (%)
Female	49	50	46
Age < 30	55	40	51
College-educated	48	25	61
Algiers	8	9	16
Unemployed	12	21	21
Democracy-Best Government		68	61
Democracy-Suitable		52	56
Economy Bad or Very Bad		85	91
Trust Police		48	52
N	41,320,000	2,332	10,441

While not nationally representative, surveying the Facebook population offers several advantages over traditional surveys. First, as an online survey, it does not put any survey team in danger, a real concern in a repressive state like Algeria. Second, we were able to ask more sensitive questions than would be permitted in traditional surveys requiring government approval. The Arab Barometer, for instance, could not ask about trust in the government or parliament let alone the military. Third, Facebook allows us to target advertisements to users with specific interests. We targeted one set of ads to Algerians with an interest in the military in order to oversample military personnel (excluded in this paper).

" *This long-term survey permits us, cross-sectionally, to trace changes over time within the Algerian Facebook population*

Perhaps the most important advantage is that it is significantly cheaper than traditional surveys, allowing us to generate a much larger sample and field the survey for a much longer period of time. We have fielded the survey continuously since April 1, generating a sample of more than 14,000 Algerians (including the oversampling of military personnel, excluded in this piece). This long-term survey permits us, cross-sectionally, to trace changes over time within the Algerian Facebook population.

Measuring "protest fatigue" in Algeria

The survey therefore allows us to explore the question at hand: to what extent are Algerians still committed to the goals and tactics of the "*hirak*" – the protest movement? We begin by examining attitudes toward the over-arching goal of the protest movement: a complete change of the political system. Figure 1 plots the percent who support or strongly support a complete change among two subsets: protesters, defined as those who self-report participating in at least one protest since February, and non-protesters, who have not.

Algeria: Support for Systemic Change

Source: Online survey conducted by Grewal et al (2019)

As can be seen, the vast majority of protesters and non-protesters continue to support systemic change. In fact, support for a complete change of the political system has grown over time among both protesters (78 to 89 percent) and non-protesters (64 to 74 percent). Nine months into the protests, there has been little if any fatigue in support for the goals of the movement.

However, while the Algerian Facebook population remains committed to the *hirak*'s goals, there appears to be some disillusionment with the particular tactic of protests. Figures 2 and 3 plot the percent of respondents who support the protests and want protests to continue, respectively. As can be seen, support for the protests has slightly fallen from 94 to 80 percent among those who have protested, and from 67 to 58 percent among non-protesters. Similarly, those who want the protests to continue has fallen from 93 to 71 percent among those who have protested, and from 76 to 58 percent among non-protesters. It is important to reiterate that a majority of each group continues to support the protests; but there has been a slight decline over time, particularly since August.

Algeria: Support for the Protests

Source: Online survey conducted by Grewal et al (2019)

Algeria: Protests should continue

Source: Online survey conducted by Grewal et al (2019)

Dwindling concessions for protesters

One way to make sense of these seemingly disparate trends is to distinguish between the goals and tactics of the protest movement. While Algerians remain committed to the goal of systemic change, there may be growing doubt over whether protests will be able to achieve that goal.

At first, the weekly Friday protests were regularly met with additional concessions.[32] Between April and July, the protests succeeded in toppling not just President Bouteflika, but also his brother and advisor Said, two former prime ministers, a legendary spymaster,[33] several prominent businessmen, and other ministers and politicians. The protests, at first, seemed to be producing systemic change.

Since August, however, these concessions have become fewer and farther between. The regime has been unwilling to concede to one of the protesters' most vocal demands: the removal of interim president Abdelkader Bensalah and Prime Minister Noureddine Bedoui, both of whom are remnants of the Bouteflika regime. Instead, the regime has tried to reimpose a roadmap by once again calling for presidential elections, currently slated for December with a line-up of five Bouteflika-era officials. Meanwhile, the regime has stepped up its repression of the protest movement, arresting both opposition leaders and demonstrators.

With protests winning fewer concessions, support for the tactic of protesting may have dimmed, even while support for systemic change has increased. If this trend continues, it may set the stage for some in the movement to adopt new tactics. Calls began in August for civil disobedience,[34] potentially encompassing strikes and sit-ins beyond the transitory marches and protests. Late October then saw strikes by various labor unions and judges, while rumors have begun circulating for a general, nationwide strike as well.

In short, the protest movement shows no signs of abating. Nine months in, demands for systemic change have only grown. However, as protests struggle to achieve that goal, support may grow

for complementing protests with strikes or sit-ins. But what remains clear is that the regime has been unable to appease, repress, or tire out the protesters.

Beyond addressing these substantive questions, this piece has also highlighted one potential benefit of conducting surveys through Facebook advertisements. While not nationally representative, the lower cost of these surveys allows one to keep the survey running for longer, permitting us, cross-sectionally, to track change over time. Especially when examining questions like protest fatigue, such surveys can be particularly useful.

SURVEYING NUCLEAR ATTITUDES IN THE MIDDLE EAST:

PERCEPTIONS, MISPERCEPTIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH[1]

By Matt Buehler, University of Tennessee

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) has recently experienced what Mehran Kamrava has dubbed a "nuclear renaissance."[35] Since 2000, nearly a dozen Arab states have either launched nuclear energy programs or declared intent to develop advanced civilian nuclear technology. Most notably, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has aggressively pursued a nuclear energy program, while Jordan, Algeria, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia have each undertaken major steps to develop nuclear energy. Morocco has had an active nuclear research program since the mid-1980s, with an operational research reactor at its Maamora site since 2009.[36] Even Tunisia, with its economic problems following the 2011 revolution, has shown interest in civilian nuclear energy, signing a deal in 2016 with Russia's state-owned nuclear reactor vendor company, Rosatom, to help develop its civilian nuclear program.[37] Kuwait started a civilian nuclear program in 2009, but abandoned it for fear that a meltdown—on the scale of Chernobyl—could leave this entire small country's

territory uninhabitable.[38]

How do ordinary Arab citizens feel about these nuclear programs? Few studies have analyzed public attitudes toward the burgeoning nuclear programs of Arab states in the MENA. We know little about how Arab citizens view these programs' possible benefits and costs, their aftereffects on intra-regional relations, and their repercussions for international treaties and organizations—especially the 1968 Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Tracking citizens' attitudes toward these nuclear programs furnishes a richer, more complete understanding of their origins, development, and future potential in the MENA.

> " *Contemporary methods of survey research can help explore individual-level variation in attitudes toward the MENA's new nuclear programs*

Contemporary methods of survey research can help explore individual-level variation in attitudes toward the MENA's new nuclear programs. Collaborating with the University of Tennessee's Howard H. Baker Jr. Center for Public Policy and the Institute for Nuclear Security, in 2016 I launched a 2000-respondent nationally-representative survey in Morocco, one of the Arab world's aspiring nuclear energy states. Morocco has had an active nuclear energy research program since the 1980s, so it is reasonable to expect that most its citizens will have at least a basic understanding of their country's quest to obtain nuclear power.[39] Other Arab states' nuclear programs are newer (most have been established since 2000), so citizens' understanding might be more hypothetical and less based on historical knowledge. Of course, survey evidence gleaned from one country case study is limited, though it provides a starting-point for more research. Future studies might seek to examine how attitudinal trends from Morocco about nuclear programs either parallel or contradict public

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[29] There are important ethical questions about the data Facebook collects on its users. Since our survey is conducted on a separate platform, Qualtrics, Facebook only learns whether a user engaged with or clicked on the advertisement – not whether they took the survey let alone their answers.

[30] See: https://www.internetworldstats.com/stats1.htm

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